We have a bunch of issues with online identity. Like, I have at least 20 different ways to contact some of my friends, send half my life trying to separate out people being themselves from massive coordinated cross-platform campaigns, and dozens of issues with privacy, openness (like do we throw a message into the infinite beerhall that’s twitter or deliberately email to just a few chosen peeps). How much of this has happened because our base unit of contact has changed from an individual human to an online account?
I’m wondering if there’s a way to switch that back again. Zeynep Tufecki said that people stayed on Facebook despite its shortcomings because that’s where the school emergency alerts, group organisation etc were. What if we could make those things platform-independent again? I mean we have APIs, yes? They’re generally broadcast, or broadcast-and-feedback, yes?
I guess this is two ideas. One is to challenge the idea that everything has to be instant-to-instant. Yeah, sure, we want to chat with our friends. But do we really need instant chat on everything? If we drop that, can we build healthier models?
The second idea is to challenge the account-as-user idea. Remember addressbooks? Like those real physical paper books that you listed your friends, family etc names, addresses, phone numbers, emails etc in? What if we had a system that went back to that, and when you sent a message to someone it went to their system of choice in your style of choice (dm, group, public etc). I get that you’re all unique etc, and I’m still cool with some of you having multiple personalities, but this 20 ways to contact a person — that’s got old, and fast.
The third (because who doesn’t like a fourth book in a trilogy) is to give people introvert time. Instead of having control over our electronic lives by putting down the electronics, have a master switch for “only my mother can contact me right now”.
The AMITT framework so far is a beautiful thing — we’ve used it to decompose different misinformation incidents into stages and techniques, so we can start looking for weak points in the ways that incidents are run, and in the ways that their component parts are created, used and put together. But right now, it’s still part of the “admiring the problem” collection of misinformation tools -to be truly useful, AMITT needs to contain not just the breakdown of what the blue team thinks the red team is doing, but also what the blue team might be able to do about it. Colloquially speaking, we’re talking about countermeasures here.
Go get some counters
Now there are several ways to go about finding countermeasures to any action:
Go look at ones that already exist. We’ve logged a few already in the AMITT repo, against specific techniques — for example, we listed a set of counters from the Macron election team as part of incident I00022.
Pick a specific tactic, technique or procedure and brainstorm how to counter it — the MisinfosecWG did this as part of their Atlanta retreat, describing potential new counters for two of the techniques on the AMITT framework.
Wargame red v blue in a ‘safe’ environment, and capture the counters that people start using. The Rootzbook exercise that Win and Aaron ran at Defcon AI Village was a good start on this, and holds promise as a training and learning environment.
Run a machine learning algorithm to generate random countermeasures until one starts looking more sensible/effective than the others. Well, perhaps not, but there’s likely to be some measure of automation in counters eventually…
Learn from the experts
So right. We get some counters. But hasn’t this all been done before. Like if we’re following the infosec playbook to do all this faster this time around (we really don’t have 20 years to get decent defences in place — we barely have 2…) then shouldn’t we look at things like courses of action matrices? Yes. Yes we should…
Courses of Action Matrix 
So this thing goes with the Cyber Killchain — the thing that we matched AMITT to. Down the left side we have the stages; 7 in this case; 12 in AMITT. Along the top we have six things we can do to disrupt each stage. And in each grid square, we have a suggestion of an action (I suspect there are more than one of these for each square) that we could take to cause that type of disruption at that stage. That’s cool. We can do this.
The other place we can look is at our other parent models, like the ATT&CK framework, the psyops model, marketing models etc, and see how they modelled and described counters too — for example, the mitigations for ATT&CK T1193 Spearphishing.
Make it easy to share
Checking parent models is also useful because this gives us formats for our counter objects— which is basically that these are of type “mitigation”, and contain a title, id, brief description and list of techniques that they address. Looking at the STIX format for course-of-action gives us a similarly simple format for each counter against tactics — a name, description and list of things it mitigates against.
We want to be more descriptive whilst we find and refine our list of counters, so we can trace our decisions and where they came from. A more thorough list of features for a counter list would probably include:
list of tactics can be used on
list of techniques can be used on
expected action (detect, deny etc)
who could take this action (this isn’t in the infosec lists, but we have many actors on the defence side with different types of power, so this might need to be a thing)
anticipated effects (both positive and negative — also not in the infosec lists)
anticipated effort (not sure how to quantify this — people? money? hours? but part of the overarching issue is that attacks are much cheaper than defences, so defence cost needs to be taken into account)
And be generated from a cross-table of counters within incidents, which looks similar to the above, but also contains the who/where/when etc:
list of tactics it was used on
list of techniques it was used on
action (detect, deny etc)
who took this action
effects seen (positive and negative)
incident id (if known)
date (if known)
“Boundaries for Fools, Guidelines for the Wise…”
At this stage, older infosec people are probably shaking their heads and muttering something about stamp collecting and bingo cards. We get that. We know that defending against a truly agile adversary isn’t a game of lookup, and as fast as we design and build counters, our counterparts will build counters to the counters, new techniques, new adaptations of existing techniques etc.
But that’s only part of the game. Most of the time people get lazy, or get into a rut — they reuse techniques and tools, or it’s too expensive to keep moving. It makes sense to build descriptions like this that we can adapt over time. It also helps us spot when we’re outside the frame.